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IN THE SUPREME COURT
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BURTON DENBY
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vs.
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF

Case No. 141.41

UTAH,

Defendant-Respondent.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIE!'

Appeal from a decision by the Board 0£ ·•.
Industrial Commission of ~'
"-.··'

PLOYD G. ASTIN
Special Assistant
Attorney General
Industrial Conunission of Utah
Department of Employment Security
l74 Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
'lttorney for Defendant;
Respondent
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BURTON DENBY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 14841

THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Defendant-Respondent.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision by the Board of
Review, Industrial Commission of Utah, denying unemployment
compensation benefits to Plaintiff on the grounds that he
voluntarily left his employment without good cause and subsequently was unavailable for work.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of Defendant's decision and
the award of benefits from March 21, 1976, until Plaintiff
is otherwise ineligible.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff was employed by the United States Postal
Service in Salt Lake City until February 13, 1976, when he
.
. · y which
terminated his employment due to an on-the-Job inJur '
aggravated his arthritis and rendered him unable to perform
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all of his duties.

Plaintiff then returned to his home town

of Fallon, Montana, to live on a family ranch.

He applied

for unemployment benefits in Montana and began searching for
work in the area around Fallon.

He was disqualified for

four weeks beginning March 21, 1976, on the grounds of
voluntary leaving without good cause and denied benefits indefinitely on the grounds of unavailability for work.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS INCORRECTLY DISQUALIFIED PLAINTIFF ON
THE GROUNDS THAT HE LEFT WORK WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE,
SINCE THERE IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT SUCH A CONCLUSION.
This Court's review is limited to deciding whether
there is "substantial competent evidence to sustain the
findings and decision of the Appeals Referee and the Board
of Review."

Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 U.2d 131, 477

P.2d 587,588 (1970). In the present case, a variety of
deficiencies in the proceedings render Defendant's final
decision unsustainable.
The applicable statute, U.C.A. §35-4-lO(e), authorizes
the Commission to regulate the specific procedures for
hearings and states that these regulations need not conform
to the rules of evidence.

The specific regulation involved

here, Regulation 4(b) (1), Appeals to an Appeals Referee of
the Department of Employment Security Rules and Regulations
(October 1, 1974), states:
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All hearings shall, after due notice to the part·
be conducted informally and in such manner as t ies,
ascertain and protect the rights of the partieso Al
'
.
1
issues
re 1 evant to the appeal shall be considered
and passed upon.

T

The fundamental defect in the present case is that
voluntary leaving under Utah Code Annotated §35-4-5 (a) was
considered at the hearing.

The notice of the hearing (R.OOI:

states the issue to be considered:

"To determine if the

Claimant is fully available for work and actively seeking
within the meaning of the law," referring to Utah Code
Annotated §35-4-4 (c) .

The issue was similarly framed in the

Montana Appeals Referee's opening remarks.

(R.0017)

These

statements do not constitute "due notice" and "consideration
of all the issues."

While several

of the Referee's question:
a~

dealt with Plaintiff's employment at the Postal Service
his leaving, none focused on the crucial element of good
cause for the leaving.

Furthermore, all the testimony

relevant to good cause is wholly favorable to Plaintiff a~
was not considered by Defendant.
Instead, Defendant has relied solely on a report obtaine:
from the employer "relative to the reason for separation,"
(R.0012) which is not part of the record.

Apparently t~

report states that Plaintiff's retirement was based on
physical problems, and i t was unclear whether Plaintiff
requested an exemption from overtime work.

h~

1

(R. 0013) Defendant

·
p lai' ntiff' rather
has relied only on this report to penalize
. ch substantiate'
than relying on Plaintiff's own testimony, Whi
t
Plaintiff's claim.
This Court has repeatedly stated tha
Ila

finding cannot be based wholly upon hearsay evidence"
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I

Hackford v. Industrial Commission, 11 U. 2d 312, 358 P.2d
89 9,901(1961).

The report relied upon here is clearly

inadmissible hearsay according to the Rules of Evidence of
the supreme Court of Utah.

Therefore Defendant's decision

is not supported by any competent evidence and as a matter
of law must be reversed.
Moreover, the evidence establishes that Plaintiff did
have good cause to leave work, and therefore he should not
have been disqualified.

Defendant's General Rules of

Adjudication, Voluntary Leaving §210, state:
In considering the reasonableness of a worker's
leaving work, it may be necessary to measure his
actions by what a reasonable worker might do under
similar circumstances.
Defendant has properly promulgated these rules and is bound
by them.

Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199

(1974).

Applying

this "reasonable worker" standard, Plaintiff's leaving was
for good cause.

He testified that the job had "extreme

tensions and pressures, people passout, heart attacks,
nervous breakdwons ..•. "

(R.0019)

He further testified:

Q:

Did the arthritis affect you on the job?

A:

Oh, very uncomfortable - painful when I was on
these pills, my employers didn't know it but
these pills affected my ability in some ways .•••
Take those pills heavily it's kind of dulling
to your mind •.•.

(R.0020)

In a statement to a Montana Department representative,
Plaintiff asserted:
The job was becoming increasingly difficult for me
both psychologically and physically due to mandatory
overtime work.
I was unable to continue under the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law
Library.
Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
circumstances.
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In his appeal statement Plaintiff affirmed:
Many of the Postel Service die from heart attacks
and nervous breakdowns, before reaching retireme t
age, due to pressure and tension.
I wished to a~ 010
.,
this and continue living. (R. 0013)
Given these circumstances,

including Plaintiff's advanced

age of 64, his choice to leave was based on good cause

a~

is clearly reasonable upon consideration of the record asa
whole.
Finally, Defendant's conclusions of lack of good cause
for leaving dealt with the lack of medical evidence

~

substantiate Plaintiff's medical problems and the mandatory
overtime work as partial basis for leaving.

Again, Defendar.:

has failed to follow its own rules, by which it is bound,
specifically General Rules of Adjudication, Voluntary Leavir.,:
§235.25, Illness or Injury:
Reasonableness should be the rule in assisting the
claimant to provide his proof.
In all cases he
should be assisted with a detailed written description
of the nature of his defect, its effect on his work
or of the work on his health and his ability to
continue working.
In addition, a physician's statement
should be suggested as further proof.
In the instant case, the record does not reflect that
any such assistance was ever rendered.

In fact Plaintiff on

his own asserted that Dr. Lamb, an orthopedic specialist,
and the Personnel Section of the Salt Lake Post office coulc
provide further documentation of his medical problems, yet
assist Plair.L'
Defendant, having made no effort whatsoever to
en at tempted
in providing proof of his medical problems, th
to bolster its position by this situation.

-5-
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As to the overtime issue, Defendant draws a totally
unwarranted inference from the hearsay employer information.
The person submitting the report indicated a lack of information
as to whether Plaintiff even qualified for an exemption from
overtime.

(R.0013)

Plaintiff stated in his appeal letter

that to the best of his knowledge overtime was mandatory.
He further stated that he was not aware of any possible
exceptions to the mandatory overtime and that this was the
subject of union-management negotiations at the time.

(R.0033)

From this evidence, Defendant somehow concludes that Plaintiff
did not have good cause for leaving work.

Yet there is no

substantial competent evidence to support such a conclusion,
and it should be reversed.
POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS INCORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF BENEFITS
ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE HAS BEEN UNAVAILABLE FOR WORK,
SINCE THERE IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT SUCH A CONCLUSION.
The standard to be applied in determining availability
for work was set forth by this Court in Gocke v. Wiesley,
18 U.2d 245,249,420 P.2d.44,46

(1966):

It is our duty to examine the record and to affirm
the decision unless v. e can say as a matter of law
that the conclusion on the question of "available
for work" was wrong because only the opposite conclusions
could be drawn from the facts.
The Court then stated,

"The claimant must act in good faith

ana make an active and reasonable effort to secure employment."
More recently this Court has stated that the test is "reasonableness under the circumstances."

Lauder v. Board of Review of

Industrial Comm., 29 U.2d 121,506 P.2d 50,51 (1973).
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In Gocke,
--

the Court reversed the Board and ·held
· the

claimant entitled to benefits based on the reasonablene

.
SS Gi

her search for work.

In that case, the claimant personally

applied to her previous employer and to one other employer,
called several other employers, and answered some newspaper
advertisements.

These contacts were held reasonable

u~~

the circumstances in a large metropolitan area, Salt Lake
City.

In the instant case, Plaintiff has been continuously

registered with the Job Service office in Miles city, Monta:,
48 miles west of his home in Fallon; personally contacted a
construction company in Glendive, Montana, 26 miles east of
Fallon; personally contacted two bars in Fallon and Terry,
Montana, 11 miles west of Fallon; and personally contacted
farm chemical company in Fallon.

a

Plaintiff has applied for

as a clerical worker, bartender, salesman, and commercial
gardener.

(R. 0011, 0021-23) Despite this detailed testimony,

Defendant concludes,

"Claimant will travel as far as Terry,

Montana, population of 1,400 ..•. "

(R.0014)

This is a clear!:

erroneous conclusion not supported by any evidence.
Rather, Plaintiff, aware that he has moved to a small
town, has liberally defined the area in which he will work:
from 50 miles west of his residence to 26 miles east,

enco~·

20 / QLJLJ1
passing four towns with a combined population of over

work
and has stated his willingness to accept any suitable
given his physical problems, even work in which he has no
background.

(R.

0014)

Surely this effort cannot be charac·

terized as "passive and unreasonable." Plaintiff has under·
· circumtaken a reasonable search for employment under h is

stances in rural Montana just as did Mrs. Gocke in her

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

search in Salt Lake City.

And like Mrs. Gocke, he should be

awarded benefits,since the record clearly establishes that
as a matter of law, the claimant was available for work,
having met the "reasonableness" test outlined above.
CONCLUSION
As there is neither substantial evidence to support
disqualification of Plaintiff on the grounds of voluntary
leaving without good cause nor to support denial of benefits
to Plaintiff on the grounds of unavailability for work,
these decisions should be reversed.

Judgment should be

entered that as a matter of law Plaintiff is entitled to
unemployment compensation benefits from March 21, 1976,
until he is otherwise ineligible.
Respectfully submitted this ~day of ~c~J-~n=t¥~W6-~i"-t-lj~~~~~
1977.

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.

By

UHl-1 [b1ll1vvt15
LUCY BILLINGS
216 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

CERTIFICl,TE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed copies of the foregoing
Plaintiff's Brief to Floyd G. Astin, Special Assistant
Attorney General, Industrial Commission of Utah, Department
of Employment Security, 174 Social Hall Avenue, Salt Lake
/

City, Utah 84147, this

~~day of

1977.
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